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This study investigates the role of information sharing offices (public credit registries and 
private credit bureaus) in reducing market power for financial access in the African banking 
industry. The empirical evidence is based on a panel of 162 banks from 42 countries for the 
period 2001-2011. Three  simultaneity-robust empirical strategies are employed, namely: (i) 
Two Stage  Least Squares with Fixed Effects in order to account for simultaneity and the 
observed heterogeneity; (ii) Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) to control for 
simultaneity and time-invariant omitted variables and (iii)  Instrumental Variable Quantile 
regressions to account for simultaneity and initial levels of financial access. In order to ensure 
that information sharing offices influence market power for loan price (quantity) to decrease  
(increase), public credit registries should have between 3.156% and 3.3% coverage, while 
private credit bureaus should have between 1.443 and 18.4% coverage.  The established 
thresholds are cut-off points at which information sharing offices completely neutralise the 
negative effect of market power on financial access. The thresholds are contingent on the 
dimension (loan price versus loan quantity) and distribution (conditional mean versus 
conditional distribution) of financial access.  
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1. Introduction  
 This inquiry assesses if information sharing offices (private credit bureaus and public 
credit registries) play their theoretical role of reducing market power for financial access in 
the African banking industry. There are four main motivations for  the positioning of the 
inquiry: African financial institutions are characterised with surplus  liquidity whereas 
economic operators have limited financial access (Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009; Asongu, 
2014, p.70); the interaction of information and market power is essential in understanding the 
distribution of prices and quantities that lead to economic equilibriums (see Bergemanny et 
al., 2015);  recent empirical evidence on the nexus between information sharing offices and 
market power show that the latter, for the most part, have not significantly influenced the 
former (see Boateng et al., 2016) and  contemporary literature has concluded that financial 
institutions may be abusing their market power in order to enjoy a ‘quiet life’1 instead of 
increasing financial access (Asongu et al., 2016a).  
 This inquiry is particularly relevant to policy because information sharing offices were 
introduced across Africa, during the past decade, in order to increase financial access by 
mitigating information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers in the banking sector, 
stimulating interbank competition and reducing market power. The findings are therefore to 
inform policy makers on initiatives that can be used to effectively reduce the market power 
enjoyed by big banks which often translates into these banks setting prices far above marginal 
costs. Increasing financial access is important because it provides small businesses and 
households with the possibility of capitalising on mobilised resources to ultimately boost 
investment, productivity and economic consumption, which eventually culminates in higher 
economic prosperity and employment.  
 Noticeably, this study complements a recent strand of literature which is 
fundamentally motivated by the issue of whether big financial institutions in the African 
banking industry have been exploiting information sharing offices to increase their market 
power to the detriment of enhanced financial access (see Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Barth et al., 
2009; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2016).  Unfortunately, the underlying literature has been based 
on indirect policy inferences because an indicator of market power has not been directly 
 
1 The Quiet Life Hypothesis (QLH) is a postulation that, banks  with substantial market power would invest less 
in pursuing intermediation efficiency and enhancing financial access. According to the hypothesis, instead of 
using their favourable market position to decrease the prices of loans and/or increase the quantity of loans, such 




engaged. This inquiry therefore complements existing studies by directly engaging how 
information sharing offices interact with market power to influence financial access in the 
African banking industry.  
 Apart from the need to address a gap in the extant literature, stylized facts accord with 
the need to engage such an investigation in Africa. For instance, Ariss (2010, p. 766) has 
stated that “developing countries provide a fertile laboratory to examine issues of competition 
because they are engaged in a process of deregulation, bank privatization and financial 
liberalization, while the industry is witnessing more consolidation”. Moreover, according to 
Luoto et al. (2007, p. 313) “in many developing countries, credit information systems are still 
in their infancy, and information sharing among lenders remains weak”. The authors further 
maintain that “Africa remains the region of the world with the least developed credit 
information systems” (2007, p. 315).   
 The empirical evidence in this study is based on a panel of 162 banks from 42 
countries for the period 2001-2011; we use Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) to 
control for simultaneity and time-invariant omitted variables; Two Stage Least Squares to 
control for simultaneity and the observed heterogeneity and Quantile regressions to control 
for initial levels of financial access and the unobserved heterogeneity. 
 Our study introduces the notion of thresholds, which are particularly relevant for 
informing policy. In essence, policy is better informed if cut-off points at which information 
sharing offices completely neutralise the negative effect of market power on financial access 
can be established. Above these thresholds, information sharing offices can interact with 
market power to enhance financial access. The conception and definition of thresholds is 
consistent with Cummins (2000) that a certain stage in language proficiency needs to be 
attained, before advantages in another language can be enjoyed. Furthermore, the concept of 
thresholds is also consistent with the theory of critical mass that is substantially documented 
in the economic development literature (see Roller & Waverman, 2001; Ashraf & Galor, 
2013). A contemporary application of the notion of threshold or critical mass theory from 
interactive empirical specifications can be found in Batuo (2015). In essence, within the 
framework of this inquiry, the notion of threshold is similar to: critical masses for appealing 
effects (Batuo, 2015; Roller & Waverman, 2001); the minimum requirement for reaping 
expected effects (Cummins, 2000) and the requirements for Kuznets and U shapes (Ashraf & 
Galor, 2013).  


The rest of the paper is organised in the following manner. In section 2 we discuss 
theoretical underpinnings and the relevant literature. Data and methodology are covered in 
Section 3, while Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes with future 
research directions.   
 
2. Theoretical underpinnings and related literature  
 During the past decade, information sharing offices have been introduced across 
Africa in order to increase financial access (see Lin et al., 2011; Boateng et al., 2016). Such 
information sharing offices are theoretically expected to mitigate information asymmetry 
between borrowers and lenders; boost interbank competition and reduce the market power 
enjoyed by big banks in the industry. While the theoretical framework of this inquiry is 
particularly concerned with the third effect of information sharing, the others also 
complement the ultimate goal of increasing financial access.  
In essence, the theoretical relationship between information sharing and market power is 
founded on the anticipation that information sharing reduces informational rents previously 
enjoyed by big banks and hence, increases interbank competition by making the credit market 
more contestable (see Jappelli & Pagano, 2002). Ultimately, information sharing offices act as 
market brokers by enabling enhanced competition for credit, reduced constraints to credit and 
efficiency in the transformation of mobilised resources into credit for economic operators. 
These underpinnings for the most part are in accordance with theoretical literature on the 
relationship between market power and information (see Bergemanny et al., 2015) 
 According to Bergemanny et al. (2015), the consumer can exercise market power by 
strategically changing the quantity he/she demands in order to influence the demand curve 
and market price. A producer can also strategically influence the supply curve and thereby the 
market price by determining the quantity of commodities he/she supplies at a given point in 
time. It follows that price and quantity effects are closely associated with market power since 
prices respond to both consumer demand shifts and producer supply shifts. From the 
consumer’s point of view, marker power is associated with inefficiency because the 
consumer’s marginal value is greater than the market price. In the same vein, from a 
producer’s perspective, when the marginal cost of production is substantially lower than the 
supply price, considerable gain is made.  
Since the ability of consumers and producers to generate such inefficiencies builds on 
information asymmetry in the market, information sharing is important in curbing the 


underlying inefficiencies. It follows that the exercise of market power fundamentally builds 
on the presence of information asymmetry. This theoretical background aligns with the 
positioning of our study from two angles. On the one hand, we measure market power in the 
banking sector as the rate at which prices are set above marginal cost. On the other hand, 
information sharing offices have a fundamental mission of decreasing information asymmetry 
that limits financial access. Furthermore, credit information systems are intuitively expected 
to have significant effects on market power because monopolistic features of large financial 
institutions become hard to conceal owing to the increasing transparency and availability of 
previously privileged information and also a reduction in informational rents.  
Over the past three decades, the concern about market power and financial access has 
been at the heart of scholarly and policy discourses (Townsend, 1979; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; 
Aghion & Bolton, 1992; Neven & Roller, 1999; Maudo & Fernandez de Guevara, 2007; 
Boateng et al., 2016). Such interest is considerably motivated by the inefficient externalities 
of market power in the banking sector, notably, net losses in economic and social welfare 
(Maudo & Fernandez de Guevara, 2007).   
 The literature is consistent with the position that market power is associated with 
lower economic prosperity, lower saving and investment levels and higher financial 
intermediation cost (see Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Djankov et al., 2007).  Given the negative 
development consequence of market power, both developing and developed countries have 
been tailoring policies towards reducing information asymmetry and enhancing competition 
in the banking sector. A notable reform within this framework in the African financial 
industry has been the liberalisation of the banking sector, a policy led by the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
Moreover, there is a growing realisation by many lending institutions on the continent 
that credit information systems are also essential for increasing financial access. Such a 
realisation aligns with dominant power theories of credit that have been advanced and 
formalised in scholarly circles (see Townsend, 1979; Jaffee & Russell, 1976; Stiglitz & 
Weiss, 1981; Aghion & Bolton, 1992; Hart & Moore, 1994). According to these theories of 
credit, two main characteristics affect the level at which financial systems grant credit to 
individuals and firms, namely: information and the power of creditors i.e., their market power.  


More contemporary literature suggests that compared to big banks, smaller banks are 
linked to lower margins of interest (see Beck & Hesse, 2006; Ahokpossi, 2013). This is a 
paradox because, banks with greater market power are expected to be associated with lower 
interest margins because of the economies of scale they enjoy (internal and external 
advantages). Unfortunately, instead of increasing access to finance, big banks have been 
documented to reflect more financial allocation inefficiency (Mitchell & Onvural, 1996).  
Three main points have been advanced to elucidate this paradox. Firstly, larger banks may be 
more concerned about enjoying a ‘quiet life’ than with increasing financial access (Mitchell & 
Onvural, 1996). Secondly, bigger banks are not exclusively associated with economies of 
scale and could also be linked with considerable diseconomies of scale, which engender 
inefficiencies in terms of poor organisation, coordination and management (Berger et al., 
1987; Noulas et al., 1990; Mester, 1992; Clark, 1996; Karray & Chichti, 2013). Finally, big 
banks could be using information sharing offices to increase their profit margins (Brown & 
Zehnder, 2010; Boateng et al., 2016).  
In spite of the perceived advantages that are linked to the introduction of credit 
information services across Africa, a recent stream of banking literature shows that big banks 
are continuing to take advantage of their positions to enjoy a ‘quiet life’ (Boateng et al., 2016; 
Tchamyou & Asongu, 2016). 
 
3. Data and Methodology  
3.1 Data 
This study investigates a panel of 162 banks with data from 42 countries for the period 2001-
2011. The data has been sourced from Bankscope and World Development Indicators. The 
periodicity, number of countries and banks are based on data availability constraints. It is 
important to note that data on information sharing is only available from the year 2011.  
 Consistent with recent literature (Ariss, 2010; Boateng et al., 2016), we use the Lerner 
Index to measure market power. The index takes into account the degree to which banks set 
prices above marginal costs. Hence, a higher index implies more market power. We discuss 
the steps to be followed to compute the index in greater detail in Section 3.1.1. Private credit 
bureaus and public credit registries have been used as a proxy for information sharing offices 
 
 Consistent with Beck and Hesse (2006, p.1), the size of a bank considerably affects variations in the interest 
rate margins/spreads in the banking sector. Ngigi (2013ab) has shown that in Kenya, compared to small banks, 
big banks are associated with higher cost of loans. Moreover, in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), policies that are 
designed to reduce market competition and increase interbank competition contribute towards reducing interest 
margins (Ahokpossi (2013, p.1). 
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(s e e Dj a n k o v et al., 2 0 0 7; Tri ki & G aji g o, 2 0 1 4). L o a n pri c e a n d l o a n q u a ntit y eff e cts ( w hi c h 
a re d e p e n d e nt v ari a bl es) ar e m e as ur e d r es p e cti v el y b y ‘ pri c e c h ar g e d o n l o a ns ’ a n d 
‘l o g arit h ms of l o a ns’ ( C o c c or es e & P ell e c c hi a , 2 0 1 0;  As o n g u & L e R o u x, 2 0 1 6).  
  T hr e e s ets of c o ntr ol v ari a bl es ar e a d o pt e d, n ot a bl y:  m ar k et-r el at e d f e at ur e s 
( P o p ul ati o n d e nsit y, I nfl ati o n a n d G D P p er c a pit a gr o wt h);  b a n k- ori e nt e d c h ar a ct eristi cs 
( D e p osit/ Ass ets a n d B a n k br a n c h es) a n d t h e u n o bs er v e d h et er o g e n eit y s u c h as  ‘ c o m pli a n c e 
wit h S h ari a fi n a n c e ’ ( N o n-Isl a mi c v ers us ( vs) Isl a mi c); si z e (l ar g e vs. s m all) a n d o w n ers hi p 
(f or ei g n vs. d o m esti c).  T h e c h oi c e of t h es e c o ntr ol v ari a bl es is i n a c c or d a n c e wit h r e c e nt 
lit er at ur e o n fi n a n ci al a c c ess i n t h e Afri c a n b a n ki n g i n d ustr y (s e e As o n g u & L e R o u x, 2 0 1 6; 
B o at e n g et al., 2 0 1 6).  
W e pr o vi d e h y p ot h es es o n t h e si g ns t h at w e w o ul d e x p e ct t o fi n d o n a n al ysi s of t h e d at a. 
Firstl y, wit h r es p e ct t o m ar k et- ori e nt e d c h ar a ct eristi cs, t h e f oll o wi n g c a n b e a nti ci p at e d:  
•  G D P p er c a pit a ( w hi c h a c c o u nts f or fl u ct u ati o ns i n t h e b usi n ess c y cl e) is a nti ci p at e d t o 
p ositi v el y aff e ct t h e q u a ntit y of l o a ns. T h e e x p e ct e d si g n f or t h e pri c e of l o a ns is 
diffi c ult t o est a blis h b e c a us e it d e p e n ds o n m ar k et e x p a nsi o n a n d d y n a mis m. 
H o w e v er, d e cr e asi n g G D P p er c a pit a c a n aff e ct b ot h l o a n pri c e a n d l o a n q u a ntit y, 
o wi n g t o d e cr e asi n g d e m a n d. A n e g ati v e eff e ct is a nti ci p at e d fr o m G D P p er c a pit a 
b e c a us e it h as b e e n d e cr e asi n g o v er t h e p ast d e c a d e, o wi n g t o t h e p o p ul ati o n gr o wi n g 
m or e pr o p orti o n at el y t h a n G D P.   
•  P o p ul ati o n d e nsit y is e x p e ct e d t o i nfl u e n c e b ot h d e p e n d e nt v ari a bl es p ositi v el y, 
ess e nti all y b e c a us e a gr o wi n g d e m a n d f or l o a ns d u e t o hi g h p o p ul ati o n d e nsit y is als o 
li k el y t o p ositi v el y aff e ct t h e pri c e of l o a ns.  
•  I nfl ati o n s h o ul d i nt uiti v el y i n cr e as e ( d e cr e as e) t h e pri c e ( q u a ntit y) of l o a ns. 
A c c or di n gl y, si n c e l ess i n v est m e nt ( a n d t h er ef or e l o a n q u a ntit y) is li k el y i n p eri o ds of 
e c o n o mi c u n c ert ai nt y ( e. g. c h a oti c i nfl ati o n), t h e pri c e of l o a ns ( or i nt er est c h a n g e d) is 
a dj ust e d f or i nfl ati o n. It is i m p ort a nt t o n ot e t h at i n v est ors h a v e b e e n d o c u m e nt e d t o 
pr ef er i n v esti n g i n e c o n o mi c e n vir o n m e nts t h at ar e l ess a m bi g u o us (s e e K els e y & L e 
R o u x, 2 0 1 6; L e R o u x & K els e y, 2 0 1 6).  
S e c o n dl y, wit h r e g ar d t o t h e b a n k-r el at e d c h ar a ct eristi cs, t h e f oll o wi n g c a n b e e x p e ct e d: 
•  I nt uiti v el y, w hil e t h e n u m b er of b a n k br a n c h es h as a p ositi v e i nfl u e n c e o n t h e q u a ntit y 
of l o a ns, it h as a n e g ati v e eff e ct o n l o a n pri c es.  
•  T h e ‘ d e p osit t o ass et’ r ati o is e x p e ct e d t o b o ost b ot h t h e pri c e a n d t h e q u a ntit y of 
l o a ns. T his is ess e nti all y b e c a us e m o bilis e d d e p osits ar e t h e m ai n s o ur c e of fi n a n ci n g 
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f or b a n ks. T h er ef or e a gr e at er pr o p orti o n of d e p osits i n li q ui d li a biliti es c a n b o ost 
lo a n q u a ntit y a n d/ or m ar gi ns i n i nt er est r at e, gi v e n t h at g o o d or g a nis ati o n is ess e nti al 
f or a d e q u at e m a n a g e m e nt a n d eff e cti v e m o bilis ati o n of u n d erl yi n g b a n k r e s o ur c es.   
T hir dl y, e x p e ct e d si g n s fr o m d u m m y v ari a bl es us e d t o c o ntr ol f or t h e u n o bs er v e d 
h et er o g e n eit y ar e diffi c ult t o est a blis h. I n p arti c ul ar, w e n ot e t h at: 
•   B a n ks, irr es p e cti v e of si z e (s m all vs. bi g), c a n b e li n k e d t o b ot h n e g ati v e a n d 
p ositi v e i m p a cts a c cr ui n g fr o m l o a n d y n a mi cs, t h o u g h b a n ks wit h s u bst a nti al 
si z es c o ul d c o m p ar ati v el y b e m or e ass o ci at e d wit h c o or di n ati o n a n d 
m a n a g e m e nt c o n c er ns c o n n e ct e d wit h b a n k si z e. M or e o v er, t a c kli n g a p p ar e nt 
c h all e n g es t h at ar e i n h er e ntl y ass o ci at e d wit h t h e i n cr e asi n g si z e of b a n ks is 
als o a s o ur c e of i n effi ci e n c y, gi v e n c o n c er ns t h at m a y b e e n c o u nt er e d wit h t h e 
r es ol uti o n of c o nfli cts c o n n e ct e d t o c ust o m er r e q uir e m e nts a n d n e e ds.  
•  Si mil arl y, t h e i n ci d e n c e s of o w n ers hi p h et er o g e n eit y (f or ei g n vs. d o m esti c 
b a n ks) a n d c o m pli a n c e wit h S h ari a fi n a n c e (Isl a mi c vs. N o n-Isl a mi c) ar e 
c o nti n g e nt o n a v ari et y of c h ar a ct eristi cs s u c h as, st affs’ c a p a citi es i n 
or g a nis ati o n, m ar k et e x p a nsi o n a n d m ar k et d y n a mis m.  
A t a b ul ar s y nt h esis of e x p e ct e d si g ns fr o m t h e c o ntr ol v ari a bl es c a n b e f o u n d i n 
A p p e n di x 1, w hil e A p p e n di x 2 pr o vi d es t h e d efi niti o ns a n d s o ur c es of v ari a bl es.  A p p e n di x 3 
a n d A p p e n di x 4 pr o vi d e t h e s u m m ar y st atisti cs a n d c orr el ati o n m atri x, r es p e cti v el y.  
 
3. 2 M et h o d ol o g y  
3. 2. 1 Esti m ati o n of M ar k et P o w er ( L er n er I n d e x)  
W e e m pl o y t h e st o c h asti c fr o nti er m o d el i n esti m ati n g t h e L er n er I n d e x f or m ar k et p o w er. 
T h e e m pl o y m e nt of t h e a p pr o a c h is c o nsist e nt wit h b ot h c o nt e m p or ar y ( C o c c or es e & 
P ell e c c hi a, 2 0 1 0; B o at e n g et al., 2 0 1 6) a n d n o n- c o nt e m p or ar y ( B att es e & C o elli, 1 9 9 2) 
lit er at ur es. A c c or di n g t o C o c c or es e a n d P ell e c c hi a ( 2 0 1 0), t his esti m ati o n a p pr o a c h is m or e 
effi ci e nt w h e n c o m p ar e d t o ot h er m o d elli n g t e c h ni q u es t h at ar e b as e d o n d et er mi nisti c 
fr o nti ers (s e e F arr ell, 1 9 5 7; Ai g n er & C h u, 1 9 6 8). T h e a d o pt e d m o d elli n g a p pr o a c h c o ntr ols 
f or t h e p ossi bilit y t h at, i n a d diti o n t o i n effi ci e n c y i n b usi n ess es, v ari ati o ns b et w e e n t h e 
fr o nti er o ut c o m e a n d t h e o bs er v e d o ut p ut c o ul d b e b as e d o n f a ct ors li k e m e as ur e m e nt err ors 
a n d st o c h asti c s h o c ks.  
  W e ass u m e t h at f or fir m i  at ti m e t , pr o d u cti o n c o sts d e p e n d o n i n p ut pri c es (W ), 
o ut p ut  (Q ), a r a n d o m err or ( v ) a n d i n effi ci e n c y ( u ). If t h e c orr es p o n di n g r a n d o m err or 
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i n effi ci e n c y t er ms ar e i d e nti c all y a n d i n d e p e n d e ntl y distri b ut e d (ii d), t h e n t h e l o g arit h mi c 
s p e cifi c ati o n r efl e cti n g t h e c ost f u n cti o n c a n b e dis cl os e d as f oll o ws: 
 
 ititititit uvWQfC ++= ),(l n  ,                                                                                  ( 1)    
   
w h er e, t h e err or t er m a n d n o n- n e g ati v e i n effi ci e n c y t er ms ar e ii d, a n d  f oll o w a n or m al 
distri b uti o n a n d a tr u n c at e d n or m al distri b uti o n, r es p e cti v el y. T h er ef or e, w hil e t h e r a n d o m 
err or ²),0(~ vit Nv σ , t h e t er m t h at c a pt ur es i n effi ci e n c y, ²),(~ uit Nu σµ .       
C ost is t h e n m o d ell e d wit h a tr a nsl o g c ost f u n cti o n, t h at e n c o m p ass es t hr e e i n p uts a n d o n e 
o ut p ut.  T h e  tr a nsl o g  c ost  f u n cti o n  w hi c h  w as  pr o p os e d  b y                                                                   
C hrist e ns e n et al. ( 1 9 7 1) a n d  e xt e n d e d b y Br o w n et al. ( 1 9 7 9) t o a m ulti pr o d u ct fr a m e w or k  
h as b e e n c o nsi d er a bl y u s e d i n c o nt e m p or ar y e m piri c al lit er at ur e (s e e K o ett er & Vi ns, 2 0 0 8; 
Ariss, 2 0 1 0;  C o c c or es e & P ell e c c hi a, 2 0 1 0; B o at e n g et al., 2 0 1 6).  
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hitit WWQWQC ααααα  
                   itithitith Q h uvWQ +++ ∑= lnl n
3
1
α  ,                                                                       ( 2) 
w h er e, Ni ,....,1=  a n d  ,,....1 Tt =  ar e s u bs cri pts i n di c ati n g b a n ks a n d ti m e, r es p e cti v el y. 
C d e n ot es t h e t ot al c ost,  Q  r e pr es e nts t h e o ut p ut, hW e nt ails f a ct or pri c es, w hil e itu  a n d itv  
ar e t h e err or a n d i n effi ci e n c y t er ms r es p e cti v el y.  
  T hr e e i n p uts a n d o n e o ut p ut ar e s p e cifi e d i n or d er t o esti m at e t h e c ost i n a r e alisti c 
m a n n er. T h e t ot al o p er ati n g c ost is m e as ur e d wit h t h e f oll o wi n g v ari a bl e s: pri c e of l a b o ur; 
pri c e of c a pit al; o ut p ut b y t ot al ass ets; i n p uts b y t h e pri c e of d e p osits a n d t ot al o p er ati n g c ost 
m e as ur e d wit h o v er h e a ds 3 .  
As  s h o w n i n E q. ( 4), t h e L er n er i n d e x is t h e n c o m p ut e d fr o m t h e pri c e a n d m ar gi n al c ost. 
W hil e t h e ‘ m ar gi n al c ost’ is o bt ai n e d fr o m t h e o ut p ut of a tr a nsl o g c ost f u n cti o n (s e e E q. ( 3)), 
t h e ‘ pri c e’ d e n ot es t h e pri c e t h at b a n ks c h ar g e o n t h eir o ut p ut or t ot al ass ets. It is c al c ul at e d as 
t h e r ati o of t ot al r e v e n u es ( n et i nt er est i n c o m e pl us n o n-i nt er est i n c o m e) t o t ot al ass ets.  
                                                          
3  T h e d e p o sit pri c e is o bt ai n e d b y di vi di n g i nt er est e x p e ns e s wit h t h e s u m of d e p o sits, s h ort t er m fi n a n c e pl u s 
m o n e y m ar k et. T h e pri c e of l a b or is d efi n e d a s t h e r ati o of p er s o n n el e x p e ns es t o t ot al a ss ets. T h e pri c e of c a pit al 
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w h er e, itP  is t h e pri c e t h at a b a n k c h ar g es o n its o ut p ut. Fr o m a t h e or eti c al p ers p e cti v e, t h e 
L e r n er i n d e x r a n g es fr o m 0 (si g nif yi n g a m ar k et wit h p erf e ct c o m p etiti o n) a n d 1 (si g nif yi n g a 
p erf e ct m o n o p ol y).  
 
3. 2 2 I nstr u m e nt ati o n a n d T w o St a g e L e ast S q u ar es esti m ati o ns   
 
  T hr e e si m ult a n eit y-r o b u st e m piri c al str at e gi es ar e us e d, n a m el y:  T w o St a g e  L e ast 
S q u ar es i n or d er t o a c c o u nt f or si m ult a n eit y a n d t h e o bs er v e d h et er o g e n eit y; G e n er alis e d 
M et h o d of M o m e nts ( G M M) t o c o ntr ol f or si m ult a n eit y a n d ti m e-i n v ari a nt o mitt e d v ari a bl es 
a n d I nstr u m e nt al V ari a bl e (I V) 4  Q u a ntil e r e gr essi o ns t o a c c o u nt f or i niti al l e v els of fi n a n ci al 
a c c ess. T h e e m pl o y m e nt of m ulti pl e esti m ati o n a p pr o a c h es f or t h e p ur p os es of r o b ust n ess is 
i n a c c or d a n c e wit h r e c e nt lit er at ur e o n fi n a n ci al a c c ess (s e e As o n g u & N w a c h u k w u, 2 0 1 6 a; 
B o at e n g et al., 2 0 1 6).   
  T h e c o n c er n a b o ut si m ult a n eit y (i n e n d o g e n eit y) is t a c kl e d b y i nstr u m e nti n g t h e 
pri v at e cr e dit b ur e a us, p u bli c cr e dit r e gistri es a n d m ar k et p o w er o n t h eir first l a gs. F or 
e x a m pl e, t h e pr o c ess of i nstr u m e nti n g p u bli c cr e dit r e gistri es c a n b e s e e n i n E q. ( 5) b el o w. 
( ) titijti P C RP C R ,1,, εδα ++= −   ,                                                                                              (5) 
w h er e, tiP C R , , is t h e p u bli c cr e dit r e gistri es i n di c at or of b a n k i  at  p eri o d t , α is a c o nst a nt, 
1, −tiP C R , r e pr es e nts  p u bli c cr e dit r e gistri es i n b a n k i  at  p eri o d 1−t , a n d ti,ε  is t h e err or t er m.  
  T h e i nstr u m e nt ati o n pr o c ess i n E q. ( 5) w hi c h is r e pli c at e d f or pri v at e cr e dit b ur e a us 
a n d t h e L er n er i n d e x c o nsists of r e gr essi n g p u bli c cr e dit r e gistri es o n t h eir first l a gs a n d t h e n 
s a vi n g t h e fitt e d v al u es w hi c h ar e t h e n e m pl o y e d as t h e i n d e p e n d e nt v ari a bl es of i nt er est i n 
t h e T w o St a g es L e ast S q u ar es a n d Q u a ntil e r e gr essi o ns. T h e s p e cifi c ati o ns ar e 
H et er os c e d asti cit y a n d A ut o c orr el ati o n C o nsist e nt ( H A C) i n t er ms of st a n d ar d err ors. 
  T h e T w o St a g e L e ast S q u ar es wit h Fi x e d Eff e cts is pr es e nt e d i n E q. ( 6) b el o w.  
                                                          
4  T hr o u g h o ut t h e st u d y, w e e m pl o y ‘I n str u m e nt al’ a n d ‘I nstr u m e nt al V ari a bl e’ i nt er c h a n g e a bl y.  T his i s si m pl y 
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w h er e, tiL Q ,  is L o a n q u a ntit y  of b a n k i  at  p eri o d t , ∂ is a c o nst a nt, I S O  r e pr es e nts 
i nfor m ati o n s h ari n g offi c es ( p u bli c cr e dit r e gistri es or pri v at e cr e dit b ur e a us), M P  d e n ot es 
M ar k et P o w er or t h e L er n er i n d e x, I nt er  is t h e i nt er a cti o n b et w e e n I S O a n d M P. W  c a pt ur es 
th e  v e ct or of c o ntr ol v ari a bl es  (G D P p er c a pit a gr o wt h, I nfl ati o n, P o p ul ati o n d e nsit y, 
D e p osit/ Ass et s , B a n k Br a n c h es)), iη  is t h e b a n k- s p e cifi c eff e cts (S m all b a n ks, D o m esti c 
b a n ks a n d Isl a mi c b a n ks) a n d ti,ε  is t h e err or t er m.  
 
3. 2. 3  G e n er ali s e d M et h o d of M o m e nt s: s p e cifi c ati o n, i d e ntifi c ati o n a n d e x cl usi o n r est ri cti o ns  
  Th e a d o pti o n of t h e G e n er alis e d M et h o d of M o m e nts ( G M M) is m oti v at e d b y fi v e 
m ai n r e as o ns, w hil e t h e first-t w o c o nstit ut e b asi c c o n diti o ns f or t h e e m pl o y m e nt of t h e 
str at e g y; t h e ot h er t hr e e r e pr es e nt ass o ci at e d- a d v a nt a g es.  
Firstl y, t h e esti m ati o n a p pr o a c h c o ntr ols f or p ersi st e n c e i n l o a n pri c e a n d q u a ntit y, si n c e t h e 
r ul e of t h u m b or i nf or m ati o n crit eri o n n e e d e d t o c o nfir m p ersist e n c e i n t h e t w o fi n a n ci al 
a c c ess v ari a bl es is m et. A c c or di n gl y, t h e c orr el ati o n b et w e e n l o a n q u a ntit y a n d l o a n pri c e a n d 
t h eir first l a gs ar e r es p e cti v el y 0. 9 9 6 a n d 0. 8 4 5, w hi c h ar e hi g h er t h a n t h e r e q uir e d 0. 8 0 0 r ul e 
of t h u m b t hr es h ol d.   
S e c o n dl y, t h e N > T crit eri o n f or t h e G M M a p pr o a c h is als o m et b e c a us e w e h a v e 1 6 2 b a n ks 
f or a n 1 1 y e ar s p a n. H e n c e, t h e n u m b er of cr o ss s e cti o ns is s u bst a nti all y hi g h er t h a n t h e 
n u m b er of ti m e s eri es i n e a c h cr oss s e cti o n. M or e o v er, t his esti m ati o n str at e g y a c c o u nts f or 
e n d o g e n eit y b y c o ntr olli n g f or si m ult a n eit y i n all t h e r e gr ess ors a n d a c c o u nti n g f or ti m e-
i n v ari a nt o mitt e d v ari a bl es i n or d er t o c o ntr ol f or t h e u n o bs er v e d h et er o g e n eit y.   
I n a d diti o n, t h e s yst e m esti m at or t a c kl es i n h er e nt bi as es t h at ar e ass o ci at e d wit h t h e diff er e n c e 
esti m at or. Fi n all y, cr os s- c o u ntr y diff er e n c es ar e t a k e n i nt o a c c o u nt b y t h e a p pr o a c h 
ess e nti all y b e c a us e G M M e x cl usi v el y d e als wit h p a n el d at a str u ct ur es.  
  As d o c u m e nt e d b y B o n d et al. ( 2 0 0 1), t h e s yst e m  esti m at or (s e e Ar ell a n o & B o n d, 
1 9 9 5;  Bl u n d ell & B o n d, 1 9 9 1) h as b ett er esti m ati o n pr o p erti es w h e n c o m p ar e d t o t h e 
diff er e n c e  esti m at or ( Ar ell a n o & B o n d, 1 9 9 1), b e c a us e it a d dr ess es t h e c o n c er ns of s m all 
s am pl e bi as es   t h at ar e ass o ci at e d wit h t h e diff er e n c e  esti m at or. I n t his st u d y, w e a d o pt a n 
e x t e nsi o n of Ar ell a n o a n d B o v er ( 1 9 9 5) b y R o o d m a n ( 2 0 0 9 a b). I nst e a d of e m pl o yi n g first 
diff er e n c es as i nstr u m e nts, t h e e xt e nsi o n a d o pts f or w ar d ort h o g o n al d e vi ati o ns w hi c h h a v e 
1 2 
 
b e e n est a blis h e d i n pri or lit er at ur e t o li mit o v er-i d e ntifi c ati o n a n d r estri ct i nstr u m e nt 
pr ol if er ati o n (s e e B alt a gi, 2 0 0 8; L o v e & Zi c c hi n o, 2 0 0 6). A t w o-st e p pr o c e d ur e is a d o pt e d i n 
pl a c e of t h e o n e-st e p  pr o c ess i n or d er t o c orr e ct f or h et er os c e d asti cit y.   
E q u a ti o ns ( 7) a n d ( 8), r e pr es e nt l e v el a n d first diff er e n c e esti m ati o n pr o c e d ur es f or 
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w h er e, τ r e pr es e nts t h e c o effi ci e nt of a ut o-r e gr essi o n a n d tξ  is t h e ti m e-s p e cifi c c o nst a nt. 
E q u ati o ns ( 7) a n d ( 8) ar e r e pli c at e d usi n g t h e s a m e r e gr ess ors, w h e n t h e d e p e n d e nt v ari a bl e is 
l o a n pri c e. 
  Cl e arl y arti c ul ati n g e x cl usi o n a n d i d e ntifi c ati o n r estri cti o ns is p ar a m o u nt f or a s o u n d 
G M M s p e cifi c ati o n. I n a c c or d a n c e wit h r e c e nt G M M lit er at ur e wit h f or w ar d ort h o g o n al 
d e vi ati o ns, all e x pl a n at or y i n di c at ors ar e c o nsi d er e d as s us p e ct e d e n d o g e n o us or 
pr e d et er mi n e d v ari a bl es w h er e as ti m e-i n v ari a nt o mitt e d i n di c at ors ar e a c k n o wl e d g e d t o 
e x hi bit stri ct e x o g e n eit y (s e e As o n g u & N w a c h u k w u, 2 0 1 6 a).  T h e i d e ntifi c ati o n c o n diti o n 
b uil ds o n t h e i nt uiti o n t h at it is u nf e asi bl e f or y e ars or ti m e-i n v ari a nt o mitt e d i n di c at ors t o b e 
first- diff er e n c e d e n d o g e n o us ( R o o d m a n, 2 0 0 9 b). T h er ef or e, t h e pr o c ess f or tr e ati n g i vst yl e 
( y e ars) is ‘i v( y e ars, e q( diff))’ w hil e t h e g m mst yl e  is us e d f or pr e d et er mi n e d v ari a bl es.  
  I n t h e li g ht of t h e a b o v e, y e ars ( w hi c h ar e a c k n o wl e d g e d t o b e stri ctl y e x o g e n o us) 
aff e ct fi n a n ci al a c c ess e x cl usi v el y t hr o u g h pr e d et er mi n e d v ari a bl es. F urt h er m or e, t h e 
st atisti c al v ali dit y of t h e e x cl usi o n r estri cti o n is e x a mi n e d wit h t h e Diff er e n c e i n H a ns e n T est 
( D H T) f or i nstr u m e nt e x o g e n eit y. It is i m p ort a nt t o n ot e t h at f ail ur e t o r ej e ct t h e n ull 
h y p ot h esis of t his t est is a n i n di c ati o n t h at t h e ti m e-i n v ari a nt o mitt e d v ari a bl es eli cit fi n a n ci al 
a c c ess e x cl usi v el y vi a t h e pr e d et er mi n e d v ari a bl e s. H e n c e, w hil e f or a st a n d ar d I V a p pr o a c h, 
r ej e cti n g t h e n ull h y p ot h esis of t h e S ar g a n O v eri d e ntif yi n g R estri cti o ns ( OI R) t est i m pli es t h at 
t h e i nstr u m e nts e x pl ai n t h e fi n a n ci al a c c ess b e y o n d t h e s us p e ct e d e n d o g e n o us v ari a bl es (s e e 
B e c k et al., 2 0 0 3; As o n g u & N w a c h u k w u, 2 0 1 6 b), wit h t h e G M M a p pr o a c h, t h e D H T is us e d 
as t h e i nf or m ati o n crit eri o n n e e d e d t o e x a mi n e if ti m e-i n v ari a nt o mitt e d v ari a bl es e x hi bit 
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stri ct e x o g e n eit y. I n t h e r es ults t h at ar e r e p ort e d i n S e cti o n 4, t his ass u m pti o n of e x cl usi o n 
re stri cti o n is c o nfir m e d, if t h e n ull h y p ot h esis of t h e D H T c orr es p o n di n g t o I V ( y e ar, e q( diff)) 
is n ot  r ej e ct e d. 
 
3. 2. 4 I nst r u m e nt al Q u a ntil e r e gr essi o ns 
  T h e m o d elli n g a p pr o a c h es c o v er e d a b o v e ar e b as e d o n m e a n v al u es of fi n a n ci al 
a c c ess. U nf ort u n at el y, o nl y e x cl usi v el y bl a n k et p oli ci es c a n b e o bt ai n e d fr o m s u c h 
esti m ati o ns. F urt h er m or e, t h e c orr es p o n di n g bl a n k et p oli ci es m a y b e i n eff e cti v e u nl ess t h e y 
ar e c o nti n g e nt o n i niti al l e v els of fi n a n ci al a c c ess a n d v ar yi n gl y s p e cifi e d a cr oss b a n ks 
c orr es p o n di n g t o l o w, i nt er m e di at e a n d hi g h l e v els of fi n a n ci al a c c ess. T his iss u e of 
m o d elli n g e x cl usi v el y at t h e c o n diti o n al m e a n of fi n a n ci al a c c ess is a d dr ess e d wit h t h e 
Q u a ntil e  R e gr essi o ns ( Q R) esti m ati o n a p pr o a c h w hi c h e n a bl es t his i n q uir y t o ass ess t h e 
re l ati o ns hi ps t hr o u g h o ut t h e c o n diti o n al distri b uti o ns of fi n a n ci al a c c e ss (s e e K e o n k er & 
H all o c k, 2 0 0 1; Bill g er & G o el, 2 0 0 9; O k a d a & S a mr et h, 2 0 1 2). S u c h a t e c h ni q u e h as r e c e ntl y 
b e e n e m pl o y e d t o i n v esti g at e t h e n e x us b et w e e n i nf or m ati o n as y m m etr y a n d fi n a n ci al a c c ess 
(s e e As o n g u et al., 2 0 1 6 b).  
  Mi n df ul of t h e a b o v e p oi nts, st u di es t h at ass ess m e a n i m p a cts wit h Or di n ar y L e ast 
S q u ar es ( O L S) ar e ess e nti all y b as e d o n t h e ass u m pti o n of n or m all y distri b ut e d err or t er ms. 
S u c h a n ass u m pti o n is n ot v ali d wit h t h e Q R a p pr o a c h. M or e o v er, t h e a p pr o a c h w hi c h e n a bl es 
a n i n v esti g ati o n of p ar a m et er esti m at es at m ulti pl e p oi nts of t h e c o n diti o n al distri b uti o n of 
fi n a n ci al a c c ess is r o b ust i n t h e pr es e n c e of o utli er s (s e e K o e n k er & B ass ett, 1 9 7 8).  
T h e θ t h q ui ntil e esti m at or of fi n a n ci al a c c ess is o bt ai n e d b y s ol vi n g t h e f oll o wi n g 
o pti mi z ati o n pr o bl e m, w hi c h is pr es e nt e d wit h o ut s u bs cri pts f or si m pli cit y i n E q. ( 9) 





















 ,                                                      ( 9) 
w h e r e, ( )1,0∈θ . C o ntr ar y t o O L S t h at is f u n d a m e nt all y b as e d o n mi ni mi zi n g t h e s u m of 
s q u ar e d r esi d u als, wit h Q R, it is t h e w ei g ht e d s u m of a bs ol ut e d e vi ati o n s t h at is mi ni mis e d. 
F or e x a m pl e, t h e 2 5 t h or 9 0t h q ui ntil es ( wit h θ = 0. 2 5 or 0. 9 0 r es p e cti v el y) ar e e x a mi n e d b y 
a p pr o xi m at el y w ei g hi n g t h e r esi d u als. T h e c o n diti o n al q ui ntil e of fi n a n ci al a c c ess or iy  gi v e n 
ix is: 
θβθ iiy xxQ ′=)/( ,                                                                                                              ( 1 0) 
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w h er e, u ni q u e sl o p e p ar a m et ers ar e m o d ell e d f or e a c h θ t h s p e cifi c q ui ntil e. T his f or m ul ati o n 
is a n al o g o us t o βixxyE ′=)/( i n t h e O L S sl o p e w h er e p ar a m et er s ar e e x a mi n e d o nl y at t h e 
m e a n of t h e c o n diti o n al distri b uti o n of fi n a n ci al a c c ess. I n E q. ( 1 0), t h e d e p e n d e nt v ari a bl e iy  
is t h e fi n a n ci al a c c ess w hil e ix  c o nt ai ns a c o nst a nt t er m, p u bli c cr e dit r e gi st ri es, pri v at e cr e dit 
b u r e a us, m ar k et p o w er, G D P p er c a pit a gr o wt h, I nfl ati o n, P o p ul ati o n d e nsit y, 
D e p osit/ Ass et s, B a n k br a n c h es, S m all b a n ks, D o m esti c b a n ks a n d Isl a mi c b a n ks.  
 
4. E m pi ri c al r es ults 
T a bl e 1 pr es e nts t h e G M M fi n di n gs a n d T a bl e s 2- 3 s h o w t h e r es ults c orr es p o n di n g t o t h e 
Q u a ntil e r e gr essi o ns. C o nsist e nt diff er e n c es i n esti m at e d c o effi ci e nts b et w e e n T w o St a g e 
L e ast S q u ar es a n d q ui ntil es (i n t er ms of si g n, si g nifi c a n c e a n d m a g nit u d e of si g nifi c a n c e) 
j ustif y t h e r el e v a n c e of t h e Q u a ntil e r e gr essi o ns e m piri c al str at e g y a d o pt e d i n o ur st u d y. 
I n T a bl e 1, t h er e ar e f o ur s p e cifi c ati o ns c orr es p o n di n g t o e a c h fi n a n ci al a c c ess 
v ari a bl e: t w o o n pri v at e cr e dit b ur e a us a n d t w o o n p u bli c cr e dit r e gistri es. Eit h er ‘ p u bli c 
cr e dit r e gistri es’ or ‘ pri v at e cr e dit b ur e a us’ s p e cifi c ati o n h as t w o s u b-s p e cifi c ati o ns, o n e 
c orr es p o n di n g t o a f ull s a m pl e a n d a n ot h er r el at e d t o a p arti al s a m pl e. T h e f ull s a m pl e is fr o m 
2 0 0 1- 2 0 1 1, w hil e t h e p arti al s a m pl e is fr o m 2 0 0 5- 2 0 1 1.  
T h er e ar e t w o m oti v ati o ns f or a d o pti n g t h e p arti al s a m pl e. Firstl y, it e n a bl e s t his st u d y 
t o li mit t h e pr olif er ati o n of i nstr u m e nts or r estri ct o v er-i d e ntifi c ati o n si n c e T (ti m e) is 
r e d u c e d. S e c o n dl y, d at a o n pri v at e cr e dit b ur e a us a n d p u bli c cr e dit r e gistri es f or t h e m ost p art 
is a v ail a bl e fr o m t h e y e ar 2 0 0 5. F o ur pri n ci p al i nf or m ati o n crit eri a ar e e m pl o y e d t o ass ess t h e 
v ali dit y of t h e G M M m o d el wit h f or w ar d ort h o g o n al d e vi ati o ns 5 . T h e fi n di n gs ar e dis c uss e d 








                                                          
5  “First, t h e n ull h y p ot h esis of t h e s e c o n d- o r d er A r ell a n o a n d B o n d a ut o c o rr el ati o n t est ( A R( 2)) i n diff er e n c e f o r t h e a b s e n c e 
o f a ut o c o rr el ati o n i n t h e r esi d u als s h o ul d n ot b e r ej e ct e d. S e c o n d t h e S a r g a n a n d H a n s e n o v er-i d e ntifi c ati o n r estri cti o n s 
( OI R) t e sts s h o ul d n ot b e si g nifi c a nt b e c a u s e t h eir n ull h y p ot h es es a r e t h e p o siti o n s t h at i n str u m e nts a r e v ali d o r n ot 
c o rr el at e d wit h t h e err o r t er ms. I n ess e n c e, w hil e t h e S a r g a n OI R t est is n ot r o b u st b ut n ot w e a k e n e d b y i n str u m e nts, t h e 
H a n s e n OI R is r o b u st b ut w e a k e n e d b y i n str u m e nts. I n o r d er t o r estri ct i d e ntifi c ati o n o r li mit t h e p r olif er ati o n of i n str u m e nts, 
w e h a v e e n s u r e d t h at i n str u m e nts a r e l o w er t h a n t h e n u m b er of cr oss-s e cti o n s i n m o st s p e cifi c ati o n s. T hir d, t h e Diff er e n c e i n 
H a n s e n T est ( D H T) f o r e x o g e n eit y of i n str u m e nts is als o e m pl o y e d t o a ss ess t h e v ali dit y of r es ults fr o m t h e H a n s e n OI R t est. 
F o u rt h, a Fis c h er t est f o r t h e j oi nt v ali dit y of esti m at e d c o effi ci e nts is als o p r o vi d e d ” ( As o n g u & D e M o or, 2 0 1 6, p. 9). 
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Table 1: Financial access effects of reducing market power with information sharing   
         
 Dependent variable: Financial Access  
 Loan Price Effects  Loan Quantity Effects  
 Public Credit Registries 
(PCR)  
Private Credit Bureaus 
(PCB) 
Public Credit Registries 
(PCR) 
Private Credit Bureaus 
(PCB) 












Constant  0.038*** 0.010 0.044*** 0.305*** 0.226*** 0.146* 0.300*** -0.305 
 (0.001) (0.860) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.052) (0.000) (0.156) 
Price of Loans (-1) 0.498*** 0.599*** 0.513*** 0.610*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Quantity of Loans  --- --- --- --- 1.010*** 1.012*** 0.978*** 1.013*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market Power  -0.002 -0.006 -0.013** 0.006 -0.115*** -0.099* -0.092** -0.071 
 (0.710) (0.481) (0.016) (0.617) (0.002) (0.071) (0.024) (0.162) 
PCR  -0.001*** -0.001*** --- --- -0.001 -0.021*** --- --- 
 (0.001) (0.007)   (0.696) (0.000)   
PCB  --- --- -0.0003 -0.0007 --- --- -0.006*** 0.0006 
   (0.374) (0.132)   (0.000) (0.597) 
PCR*Market Power  0.0005 0.0008 --- --- 0.002 0.030*** --- --- 
 (0.239) (0.200)   (0.665) (0.000)   
PCB*Market Power --- --- 0.001*** 0.0008 --- --- 0.005*** -0.0005 
   (0.004) (0.220)   (0.001) (0.754) 
GDPpcg 0.0009** 0.0006 0.0004 -0.0001 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 
 (0.023) (0.101) (0.252) (0.777) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) 
Inflation  0.0006*** 0.0007** 0.0006*** -
0.0000007 
0.0009 -0.0003 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.019) (0.002) (0.999) (0.240) (0.813) (0.157) (0.302) 
Pop. density 0.00003*** 0.00002* 0.00007*** 0.00002 0.00007 -0.00007 -0.0001 0.000005 
 (0.007) (0.088) (0.000) (0.173) (0.126) (0.372) (0.102) (0.913) 
Deposit/Assets 0.016 0.014 0.016 0.018 -0.222*** -0.048 -0.128** -0.010 
 (0.270) (0.237) (0.153) (0.477) (0.004) (0.714) (0.042) (0.828) 
Bank Branches -0.0007** -0.0005* -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001 -0.002* 0.002 -0.0002 
 (0.017) (0.084) (0.000) (0.027) (0.103) (0.085) (0.231) (0.859) 
Net effect of PCR  n.a n.a --- --- n.a -0.037 --- --- 
Threshold of PCR n.a n.a --- --- n.a 3.30 --- --- 
Net effect of PCB --- --- n.s.a n.a --- --- -0.054 n.a 
Threshold of PCB --- --- n.s.a n.a --- --- 18.40 n.a 
AR(1) (0.000) (0.742) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.028) (0.001) (0.167) 
AR(2) (0.508) (0.415) (0.449) (0.000) (0.041) (0.628) (0.193) (0.482) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.057) (0.000) (0.064) 
Hansen OIR (0.021) (0.168) (0.007) (0.487) (0.019) (0.349) (0.164) (0.341) 
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.049) (0.110) (0.012) (0.425) (0.924) (0.282) (0.905) (0.770) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.077) (0.353) (0.076) (0.488) (0.002) (0.429) (0.041) (0.169) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.025) (0.220) (0.010) (0.602) (0.009) (0.300) (0.133) (0.272) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.194) (0.221) (0.144) (0.261) (0.453) (0.498) (0.420) (0.537) 
         
Fisher  64.32*** 135.37*** 33.42*** 50.04*** 1060.85*** 1514.08*** 980.85*** 2380.31*** 
Instruments  42 41 42 40 42 40 42 41 
Banks 135 101 135 100 137 101 137 100 
Observations  627 127 618 125 637 127 628 125 
         
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1)and  AR(2) tests and; 
b) the validity of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects and/or 
unconditional effect of market power.   nsa: not specifically applicable because the information criteria does not valid the model. Mean value 





The findings are discussed in terms of marginal impacts, net effects and thresholds at 
which the policy variables (private credit bureaus and public credit registries) influence 
market power to increase financial access. For instance, from the second-to-the last column of 
Table 1, we note  that while the net effect of using private credit bureaus to influence market 
power to increase loan quantity is negative (-0.054), the corresponding marginal effect is 
positive (0.005). This implies that a certain threshold of 18.40% (0.092/0.005) coverage in 
private credit bureaus is required to reverse the sign of the unconditional effect of market 
power (-0.092) from negative to positive.  
The net effect on loan quantity is derived from the interaction between private credit 
bureaus and market power on the one hand and unconditional market power impacts on the 
other hand. For instance, when the mean value of private credit bureaus is 7.496, the 
unconditional effect of market power equals -0.092, and the corresponding conditional impact 
is 0.005, the net effect on loan quantity would be: -0.054= [0.005× 7.496] + [-0.092]. 
In the third-to-the last column of Table 1, we examine the role of public credit 
registries in market power for loan quantity, the marginal effects, net impacts and thresholds 
are respectively 0.030, -0.037 and 3.30. This implies that a threshold of 3.30% coverage is 
needed to neutralise the effect of market power. In other words, 3.30% coverage of public 
credit registries is required to reverse the negative effect of market power on financial access 
(in terms of loan quantity). The computed thresholds make economic sense because they are 
within the range (minimum to maximum) disclosed by the summary statistics, notably: 0.000 
to 49.800 for public credit registries and 0.000 to 64.800 for private credit bureaus. Most of 
the significant control variables have signs consistent with our hypothesis (Section 3.1.1). 
We now consider the findings displayed in Table 2, on the role of public credit 
registries in reducing market power for financial access. We find that net effects are negative 
in the top quintiles of the loan price distribution. Marginal effects are negative in the 0.10th 
quintile and top quintiles of the loan quantity distributions, with a corresponding threshold of 
3.156 percentage coverage in the 10th quintile being within range.  Most of the significant 
control variables have signs consistent with our hypotheses. 
Table 3 displays our findings on the role of private credit bureaus in reducing market 
power for financial access. Marginal effects from the interaction between private credit 
bureaus and market power are negative in the bottom quintiles and 0.90th quintile of the loan 
price distribution. We find that the influence of private credit bureaus in market power for 
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enhanced loans is consistent with theoretical underpinnings throughout the conditional 
distribution of loan quantity.  
Notably, there exists negative unconditional impacts from market power; positive 
marginal or conditional effects from the interaction between market power and private credit 
bureaus; positive net effects and  thresholds that are within range (0.359 to 63.894) and which 
vary from 1.443 percentage coverage (see 0.75th quintile) to 4.161 percentage coverage (see 









Table 2: Financial Access Effects of PCR with Market Power (IV QR) 
             
 Dependent variable: Financial Access 
 Loan Price Effects  Loan Quantity Effects  
 2SLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 2SLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  0.101*** 0.087*** 0.090*** 0.083*** 0.126*** 0.148*** 4.021*** 3.046*** 3.630*** 3.776*** 4.611*** 6.087*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market Power (IV) -0.004 -0.006 -0.001 0.002 -0.038*** -0.056*** -0.544*** -1.010*** -0.914*** -0.586* -0.322 -0.149 
 (0.603) (0.584) (0.774) (0.595) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.061) (0.112) (0.328) 
PCR (IV) -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.006* -0.008** -0.008*** -0.089 -0.162 -0.049 0.122 -0.259** -0.459*** 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.002) (0.070) (0.012) (0.002) (0.263) (0.108) (0.748) (0.531) (0.029) (0.000) 
PCR(IV)*Market Power(IV) 0.013*** 0.017** 0.014** 0.008 0.011** 0.012** 0.197 0.320* 0.141 -0.162 0.473** 0.802*** 
 (0.001) (0.019) (0.014) (0.193) (0.045) (0.012) (0.153) (0.069) (0.590) (0.624) (0.021) (0.000) 
GDPpcg -0.0009** -0.001** -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.016 0.033*** -0.024 -0.037 -0.028 -0.036*** 
 (0.017) (0.029) (0.233) (0.152) (0.165) (0.667) (0.179) (0.003) (0.111) (0.154) (0.146) (0.007) 
Inflation  0.001*** 0.0001 0.0009*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.012* 0.0006 -0.001 -0.012 -0.011 -0.008 
 (0.001) (0.776) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.090) (0.925) (0.911) (0.420) (0.305) (0.221) 
Pop. Density 0.00004*** 0.00003 0.00005*** 0.00008*** 0.00007*** 0.00006*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.002** -0.001*** 
 (0.009) (0.334) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.102) (0.015) (0.007) 
Deposit/Assets -0.001 -0.007 -0.003 0.006 0.006 0.001 2.135*** 1.357*** 1.988*** 2.662*** 2.116*** 0.545** 
 (0.881) (0.615) (0.666) (0.476) (0.583) (0.887) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) 
Bank Branches -0.0009*** -0.0009** -0.0009*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0002 -0.064*** -0.010* -0.039*** -0.065*** -0.072*** -0.061*** 
 (0.001) (0.010) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.545) (0.000) (0.099) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Small Banks  0.007* 0.008 0.001 0.003 -0.0008 0.0007 -0.727*** -0.909*** -1.237*** -0.864*** -0.504** -0.368*** 
 (0.098) (0.254) (0.676) (0.464) (0.893) (0.910) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.010) (0.005) 
Domestic Banks 0.002 -0.008 -0.0005 0.006* 0.010** 0.009 0.388*** 0.082 0.387*** 0.414* 0.687*** 0.521*** 
 (0.502) (0.141) (0.886) (0.086) (0.042) (0.105) (0.001) (0.519) (0.008) (0.051) (0.000) (0.000) 
Islamic Banks  -0.024*** -0.009 -0.024** -0.031*** -0.016 -0.025*** -0.508** 0.174 -0.291 -0.050 -0.940* -1.489*** 
 (0.002) (0.584) (0.015) (0.021) (0.255) (0.001) (0.035) (0.606) (0.496) (0.935) (0.056) (0.000) 
             
Net effect of the PCR  n.a n.a n.a n.a -0.013 -0.029 n.a -0.302 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Threshold of PCR n.a n.a n.a n.a 3.454 4.666 n.a 3.156 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.230 0.157 0.173 0.161 0.141 0.133 0.209 0.083 0.123 0.156 0.111 0.114 
Fisher  15.79***      24.03***      
Observations  573 573 573 573 573 573 573 573 573 573 573 573 
             
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. 2SLS: Two Stage Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions). Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations 







Table 3: Financial Access Effects of PCB with Market Power (IV QR) 
             
 Dependent variable: Financial Access 
 Loan Price Effects  Loan Quantity Effects  
 2SLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 2SLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  0.092*** 0.071*** 0.073*** 0.077*** 0.125*** 0.139*** 3.901*** 2.447*** 3.261*** 3.620*** 4.264*** 5.894*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market Power (IV) 0.0002 -0.006 0.0006 0.004 -0.042*** -0.037*** -1.099*** -1.315*** -1.213*** -1.013*** -0.605*** -0.947*** 
 (0.980) (0.339) (0.929) (0.378) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
PCB (IV) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.001 0.0006 0.002* -0.261*** -0.172*** -0.206*** -0.363*** -0.240*** -0.270*** 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.016) (0.158) (0.729) (0.069) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCB(IV)*Market Power(IV) -0.003*** -0.003* -0.004** -0.002 -0.0008 -0.003* 0.453*** 0.316*** 0.362*** 0.621*** 0.419*** 0.465*** 
 (0.004) (0.056) (0.041) (0.240) (0.788) (0.072) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDPpcg -0.0008** -0.001** -0.0008* -0.0008** 0.00009 0.0002 0.001 0.017 0.008 -0.004 -0.016 -0.018* 
 (0.047) (0.038) (0.094) (0.048) (0.873) (0.633) (0.900) (0.126) (0.539) (0.854) (0.359) (0.086) 
Inflation  0.001*** 0.0007 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** -0.007 0.001 0.004 -0.015 -0.005 0.003 
 (0.000) (0.166) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.326) (0.889) (0.606) (0.286) (0.551) (0.626) 
Pop. Density 0.00003** 0.00007*** 0.00003** 0.00004*** 0.00002 0.000001 -0.0006* -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0004 
 (0.012) (0.001) (0.020) (0.002) (0.221) (0.917) (0.056) (0.263) (0.689) (0.485) (0.201) (0.374) 
Deposit/Assets 0.003 -0.009 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.001 2.438*** 1.489*** 1.947*** 2.894*** 2.624*** 1.107*** 
 (0.694) (0.421) (0.509) (0.341) (0.594) (0.930) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bank Branches -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.052*** 0.002 -0.031*** -0.055*** -0.069*** -0.064*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.717) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Small Banks  0.005 0.015** 0.0001 0.002 0.002 0.009 0.742*** -0.547*** -1.124*** -0.636*** -0.556*** -0.451*** 
 (0.196) (0.010) (0.971) (0.542) (0.673) (0.125) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) 
Domestic Banks -0.0006 -0.007 0.00007 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.350*** 0.174 0.455*** 0.418** 0.489*** 0.493*** 
 (0.846) (0.137) (0.985) (0.359) (0.393) (0.139) (0.003) (0.174) (0.000) (0.045) (0.001) (0.000) 
Islamic Banks  -0.019** -0.001 -0.023** -0.025** -0.018 -0.033** -0.309 0.462 -0.228 0.186 -0.531 -1.100*** 
 (0.011) (0.900) (0.011) (0.010) (0.244) (0.015) (0.223) (0.164) (0.518) (0.756) (0.222) (0.002) 
             
Net effect of the PCB  n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a -0.059 2.353 1.093 1.545 3.719 2.588 2.596 
Threshold of PCB n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a Synergy 2.426 4.161 3.350 1.631 1.443 2.036 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.207 0.184 0.162 0.142 0.122 0.125 0.254 0.117 0.147 0.186 0.146 0.129 
Fisher  10.47***      30.87***      
Observations  572 572 572 572 572 572 572 572 572 572 572 572 
             
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable.  2SLS: Two Stage Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions). Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations 
where financial access is least. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects and/or unconditional effect of market power.  Mean value of IVPCB is 7.621. Range of IVPCB is 0.359 to 63.894.  Synergy 





5. Conclusions and future research directions  
 This study has investigated the role of information sharing offices (public credit 
registries and private credit bureaus) in reducing market power for financial access in the 
African banking industry. The empirical evidence is based on a panel of 162 banks from 42 
countries for the period 2001-2011. Three simultaneity-robust empirical strategies are 
employed, namely: Two Stage Least Squares in order to account for simultaneity and the 
unobserved heterogeneity; Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) to control for 
simultaneity and time-invariant omitted variables and Instrumental Variable (IV) Quantile 
regressions to account for simultaneity and initial levels of financial access. 
 Our analysis based on the GMM estimation establishes the following results:  Firstly, 
the unconditional (marginal or conditional) effect of using private credit bureaus to influence 
market power to increase loan quantity is negative (positive) and a corresponding threshold of 
18.40 percent coverage in private credit bureaus is required to reverse the negative 
unconditional effect of market power. Secondly, on the role of public credit registries in 
market power for loan quantity, the marginal effects, net effects and thresholds are 
respectively 0.030, -0.037 and 3.30. This implies that a threshold of 3.30% coverage in public 
credit registries is required for public credit registries to reverse the negative effect of market 
power on loan quantity. 
 Our analysis based on the Quantile Regressions establishes the following results:  In 
terms of the role of public credit registries in reducing market power for financial access; net 
effects are negative in the top quintiles of the loan price distribution and marginal effects are 
negative in the 0.10th quintile and top quintiles of the loan quantity distributions, with a 
corresponding threshold of 3.156% coverage in the 10th quintile.  In terms of the relevance of 
private credit bureaus, marginal effects from the interaction are negative in the bottom 
quintiles and the 0.90th quintile of the loan price distribution. With regards to the incidence on 
loan quantity, there are consistently negative unconditional impacts from market power;  
positive marginal or conditional effects from the interaction between market power and 
private credit bureaus;  positive net effects and thresholds that are within range and which 
vary from 1.443% coverage (at the 0.75th quintile) to 4.161 % coverage (at the 0.10th quintile).  
 Results broadly show that information sharing offices are for the most part playing 
their theoretical role of reducing market power in order to enhance financial access in the 
African banking industry.  Our findings further clarify those of Boateng et al. (2016), who 
have concluded that information sharing offices have not significantly reduced market power 
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in the African banking industry. Hence, we have demonstrated in this extension that an 
indirect assessment with financial access as the outcome variable is more likely to produce 
desired results on the nexus between information sharing offices and market power.   
This inquiry is not directly comparable with other studies because of the scarce 
literature on market power in Africa. However, it does provide underpinnings from which 
future research can build to improve extant literature on the field. Assessing how information 
sharing offices interact with other information sharing mechanisms/channels in order to 











































Appendix 1: Summary of hypothesised signs  
  
Variables 
Expected sign on loan 
price 
Expected sign on loan 
quantity 
    
Bank-oriented 
features  
Deposit/Asset ratio   + + 
Bank Branches  - + 
    
Market-related 
characteristics  
GDP per capita growth Uncertain  + 
Population density  + + 
Inflation  + - 
    
Characteristics of the 
unobserved 
heterogeneity  
Small versus (vs). Big  banks Uncertain Uncertain 
domestic vs. foreign  banks Uncertain Uncertain 
Islamic vs. non-Islamic  banks Uncertain Uncertain 
    
 
 
Appendix 2: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions Sources 
    
Market Power Lerner index The ratio of the ‘difference between the 
Marginal Cost and Price’ on the Price 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
    
Loan Quantity   Quantity Logarithm of Loans  Quantity BankScope 
    
Price (charged on 
Loans or Quantity) 
Price (Gross Interest and Dividend income +Total 
Non-Interest Operating Income)/Total Assets 
BankScope 
    
Public credit registries   PCR Public credit registry coverage (% of adults) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Private credit bureaus  PCB Private credit bureaus coverage (% of adults) WDI (World Bank) 
    
GDP per capita  GDP GDP per capita growth (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Inflation  Infl. Consumer Price Index (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Populaton density  Pop. People per square kilometers of land area WDI (World Bank) 
    
Deposits/Assets  D/A Deposits  on Total Assets  BankScope 
    
Bank Branches  Bbrchs Number of Bank Branches (Commercial bank 
branches per 100 000 adults) 
BankScope 
    
Small Banks Ssize  Ratio of Bank Assets to Total Assets (Assets 
in all Banks for a given period)  0.50 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
    
Large Banks Lsize  Ratio of Bank Assets to Total Assets (Assets 
in all Banks for a given period)>0.50 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
    
    
Domestic/Foreign 
banks   
Dom/Foreign Domestic/Foreign banks based on qualitative 
information: creation date, headquarters, 
government/private ownership, % of foreign 
ownership, year of foreign/domestic 
ownership…etc 
Authors’ qualitative 
content analysis.  
    
Islamic/Non-Islamic  Islam/NonIsl. Islamic/Non-Islamic banks based on financial 
statement characteristics (trading in 
derivatives and interest on loan 
payments…etc) 
Authors’ qualitative 
content analysis; Beck 
et al. (2010); Ali 
(2012). 
    
WDI: World Development Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. The following are dummy variables: Ssize, Lsize, 








Appendix 3: Summary Statistics  
       
  Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Observations 
       
Market 
Power 
Lerner 0.513 0.587 0.032 0.969 893 
       
Dependent 
variables  
Price of Loans 0.338 0.929 0.000 25.931 1045 
Quantity of Loans (ln) 3.747 1.342 -0.045 6.438 1091 
       
Information  Public credit registries  2.056 6.206 0.000 49.800 1240 
sharing  Private credit bureaus  7.496 18.232 0.000 64.800 1235 
       
Market 
variables  
GDP per capita growth 13.912 96.707 -15.306 926.61 1782 
Inflation  10.239 22.695 -9.823 325.00 1749 
Population density  81.098 106.06 2.085 633.52 1782 
       
Bank level 
variables  
Deposits/Assets  0.664 0.198 0.000 1.154 1052 
Bank Branches  6.112 6.158 0.383 37.209 1129 





variables   
Small Size  0.804 0.396 0.000 1.000 1255 
Large Size  0.195 0.396 0.000 1.000 1255 
Domestic  0.753 0.431 0.000 1.000 1782 
Foreign  0.246 0.431 0.000 1.000 1782 
Islamic  0.037 0.188 0.000 1.000 1782 
Non-Islamic  0.962 0.188 0.000 1.000 1782 
       










Appendix 4: Correlation Matrix  
                 
Market-Level Controls Bank-Level Controls Dummy-Controls Info. Sharing Lerner  
GDP Infl. Pop. D/A Bbrchs Price Quantity Ssize Lsize Dom. Foreign Islam NonIsl. PCR PCB   
1.000 0.136 0.007 -0.008 -0.068 -0.014 -0.026 -0.0002 0.0002 0.034 -0.034 0.0001 -0.0001 0.019 -0.163 -0.016 GDP 
 1.000 -0.028 0.037 -0.236 0.256 -0.009 0.046 -0.046 0.028 -0.028 -0.050 0.050 -0.205 -0.178 -0.062 Inf. 
  1.000 0.112 0.410 -0.029 -0.125 -0.098 0.098 -0.045 0.045 -0.088 0.088 0.546 -0.233 0.035 Pop. 
   1.000 -0.041 0.080 0.306 -0.041 0.041 -0.062 0.062 -0.210 0.210 -0.038 -0.083 0.021 D/A 
    1.000 -0.266 -0.227 -0.078 0.078 0.135 -0.135 -0.051 0.051 0.602 0.139 0.109 Bbrchs 
     1.000 -0.075 0.094 -0.094 0.016 -0.016 -0.097 0.097 -0.342 0.094 0.082 Price 
      1.000 -0.171 0.171 0.052 -0.052 -0.067 0.067 -0.096 0.007 -0.038 Quantity 
       1.000 -1.000 0.026 -0.026 -0.020 0.020 -0.084 0.080 -0.056 Ssize 
        1.000 -0.026 0.026 0.020 -0.020 0.084 -0.080 0.056 Lsize 
         1.000 -1.000 0.089 -0.089 0.010 0.187 0.147 Dom. 
          1.000 -0.089 0.089 -0.010 -0.187 -0.147 Foreign 
           1.000 -1.000 -0.014 -0.071 0.006 Islam 
            1.000 0.014 0.071 -0.006 NonIsl. 
             1.000 -0.151 0.051 PCR 
              1000 0.091 PCB 
               1.000 Lerner 
                 
Info: Information. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus. PCR: Public credit registries. GDP: GDP per capita growth. Infl: Inflation. Pop: Population growth. D/A: Deposit on Total Assets. Bbrchs: Bank branches. 
 Szize: Small banks. Lsize: Large banks. Domestic: Domestic banks. Foreign: Foreign banks. Islam: Islamic banks. NonIsl: Non-Islamic banks.  Price: Price of Loans. Quantity: Quantity of Loans.  
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